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Democracy and Trusts
Carla Spivack*
PART I:

INTRO

Most of us know these stories, but they bear repeating: In 1998,
Kyle Krueger sexually assaulted a four year-old boy, videotaped the act
and circulated the videotape on the Internet, for which he was criminally convicted.1 The boy’s mother, Lorie Scheffel, filed a civil suit on
behalf of both herself and her son seeking damages, and was awarded
$551,286.25.2 Krueger’s only assets, however, were in the form of a trust
created by his mother with a spendthrift clause, which barred the trust
assets from attachment by creditors.3 The trust assets were worth about
$12,000,000.4 The law of the state upheld the validity of such clauses.5
Lorie Scheffel argued for a public policy exception to the law because it
prevented tort victims, who, unlike voluntary creditors, had no choice in
the matter, from being compensated for harm.6 This, she argued, contravened the state’s strong public policy of having crime victims get
compensation from the perpetrator.7 The Court refused to make this
exception, however, citing a long held policy not to “question the wisdom or expediency of a statute.”8
* Professor of Law, Oklahoma City University School of Law. My profound
thanks to Paula J. Dalley, whose insight and clarity of mind brought this article back to
life (speaking of ghosts!); to my colleagues at Boston College, Oklahoma City University
and elsewhere whose advice and support greatly sharpened my thinking: Alfred L.
Brophy, Bridget J. Crawford, Greg Eddington, Michael Grynberg, Adam Hirsch, Ray D.
Madoff, John H. Langbein, William P. LaPiana, Chad J. Pomeroy, Kent D. Schenkel,
Robert H. Sitkoff, Andrew C Spiropoulos, and Sjef van Erp.
1 Scheffel v. Krueger, 782 A.2d 410, 411 (N.H. 2001). For criticism of the decision
in this case, see Kent Schenkel, Exposing the Hocus Pocus of Trusts, 45 AKRON L. REV.
63, 64 (2012) (observing that outcomes like this increase insurance costs); John K. Eason,
Developing the Asset Protection Dynamic: A Legacy of Federal Concern, 31 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 23, 45 n.94 (2002) (noting the injustice of the spendthrift provisions when applied to
involuntary creditors, such as tort creditors).
2 Scheffel, 782 A.2d at 411.
3 Id.
4 Memorandum for Plaintiff at 3, Scheffel v. Krueger, 782 A.2d 410 (N.H. Super.
2001) (No. 98C0308), 1998 WL 35390969 [hereinafter Sheffel Memorandum].
5 Scheffel, 782 A.2d at 411.
6 Scheffel Memorandum, 1998 WL 35390969, at *13.
7 Id. at *15.
8 Scheffel v. Krueger, 782 A.2d 410, 412 (N.H. 2001).
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On January 30, 1993, Gene A. Lorance was driving drunk and collided with Will Sligh, leaving Sligh paralyzed from the waist down, and
lacking sexual function or control of his urinary or bowel functions.9
Lorance was uninsured, so Will and his wife Lucy sued Lorance for personal injury, property damage and loss of consortium.10 Lorance’s only
assets were his interest as beneficiary of two spendthrift trusts established by his mother in 1984 and 1988, respectively.11 Will and Lucy
alleged that Lorance’s mother knew that he was a chronic alcoholic
whose mental capacity was impaired due to his drinking, that he had
numerous arrests for drunk driving, and that he had been institutionalized for mental illness.12 The Slighs argued that the court should recognize a public policy exception to spendthrift trusts in the case of
intentional or gross negligence tort creditors. The court agreed, stating
that in these cases, the policy of honoring the settlor’s intent gave way to
the policy of protecting tort victims from destitution.13 In 2004, in response, the Mississippi legislature enacted Mississippi Code Annotated
Section 91-9-503, which overruled Sligh by providing that an interest
subject to a spendthrift clause “may not be transferred and is not subject
to the enforcement of a money judgment until paid to the
beneficiary.”14
Spendthrift trusts like these which shield assets from the beneficiary’s creditors - whether voluntary or involuntary - have been controversial since their advent in the nineteenth century.15 John Chipman
Gray challenged the legitimacy of a gift that is not subject to the claims
of the donee’s creditors and thus allows the donee to “indulge himself
simultaneously in both luxury and indebtedness.”16 Objections to the
spendthrift bar to recovery by voluntary creditors have subsided somewhat today, but criticism of the bar to recovery by tort creditors has
persisted: theoretically, at least, voluntary creditors can investigate the
9

Sligh v. First Nat. Bank of Holmes Cty., 704 So. 2d 1020, 1022 (Miss. 1997).
Id.
11 Id.
12 Id. at 1023.
13 Id. at 1025.
14 MISS. CODE ANN. § 91-9-503 (2017).
15 JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON THE ALIENATION OF PROPERTY 247 (2d.
ed. 1895). See also Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U.S. 716, 729 (1875) (the Supreme Court sanctioned spendthrift clauses on the grounds that if the beneficiary were allowed to assign
his trust interest he might become a public charge). Arguably, versions of the spendthrift
trust existed earlier than the nineteenth century; for example, the married woman’s separate estate in equity, which existed in the seventeenth century, was protected from her
husband and his creditors. E-mail from John Langbein to Carla Spivack (June 17, 2017)
(on file with author). The expansion of the spendthrift trust to broad application occurred
in the nineteenth century.
16 A Rationale for the Spendthrift Trust, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1323 (1964).
10
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assets of potential debtors, the argument goes, but tort victims have no
such opportunity, and thus should be able to reach trust assets to recover damages.17
Other, very recent, forms of the trust may be causing Gray’s ghost
to walk the battlements: they take the notion of “asset protection” much
farther, allowing settlors to protect not only the beneficiary’s assets, but
the settlors’ own, from creditors; these are called “self-settled asset protection trusts,” or “Domestic Asset Protection Trusts” (hereafter
DAPTs).18 Moreover, more and more states have legalized so-called
“dynasty trusts” which allow settlors and beneficiaries to maintain assets
in trust tax free for generations, overturning long-settled principles of
the common law such as the Rule Against Perpetuities.19
Can we pacify the old mole,20 or does unfinished business doom
him to his restless walk? Gray’s objections to spendthrift trusts seem to
arise from basic notions of fairness – what we would today call “public
policy.” A donee should not be able to enjoy all the benefits of unlimited wealth while being exempt from its burdens and obligations or, put
another way, keeping the benefits while placing all the burdens on third
parties (the unpaid creditors). To say that the benefit really accrues to
the settlor, who has been able to extend his control over his assets beyond the grave, is to mortgage the living to the dead; it allows dead hand
control to go too far. As a contemporary scholar puts it, “the trust [can
be] used to skirt important obligations attached to property interests,
causing negative ramifications to unrelated third parties.”21 The interests of the living third parties must outweigh those of the dead.
17 See Schenkel, supra note 1, at 65. See also Carolyn L. Dessin, Feed a Trust and
Starve a Child: The Effectiveness of Trust Protective Techniques Against Claims for Support and Alimony, 10 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 691, 715 (1994); Anne S. Emanuel, Spendthrift
Trusts: It’s Time to Codify the Compromise, 72 NEB. L. REV. 179, 182 (1993); Justin W.
Stark, Montana’s Spendthrift Trust Doctrine: Analysis and Recommendations, 57 MONT.
L. REV. 211, 212-13 (1996); Laurene M. Brooks, Comment, A Tort Creditor Exception to
the Spendthrift Trust Doctrine: A Call to the Wisconsin Legislature, 73 MARQ. L. REV.
109, 133-41 (1989).
18 JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES 703-17
(9th ed. 2013). See also jrladmin, Domestic Asset Protection States, ATTORNEY-LASVEGAS.COM (Feb. 13, 2017), http://www.attorney-lasvegas.com/blog/domestic-asset-protec
tion-trust-states/ (stating that, as of this writing, eighteen states [most recently Michigan]
had adopted some form of DAPT: Alaska, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming). For a discussion of
additional protections for assets in both self-settled and third-party trusts, see Al W.
King, III, The Trust Spendthrift Provision—Does It Really Protect? TR. & EST., Dec.
2016, at 8.
19 DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 18, at 902.
20 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 1, sc. 5.
21 Schenkel, supra note 1, at 81 n.79.
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The new forms of trust seem to fuel these concerns. Most efforts to
identify and alleviate their perceived unfairness have drawn on public
policy22 - echoing Gray’s idea of fairness - and sheer pragmatism (the
administrative difficulty of managing trusts for centuries).23 While the
policy arguments have been exhausted, no one has yet looked to property law itself. This is a serious oversight: this article shows that property law doctrine does offer answers in the obscure but important
doctrine of numerus clausus (hereafter NC).24 NC, which means “the
number is closed,” is much more explicit in civil law discourse than in
the common law, but it is nonetheless a foundational principle of the
common law of property and one which both identifies the perceived
“unfairness” of these trusts in property law terms, and also offers a solution based in property law doctrine.25
NC means that there is a closed list of the forms and content property rights may take in a given society, limited to those which result
from the legislative – that is, democratic – process.26 NC applies to
property and not to contracts because property forms bind third parties
who were not privy to the original transaction, while contracts bind only
the parties to the bargain.27 This restriction on the creation of property
forms matters both for reasons of efficiency and democracy.28 As I explain below, NC is an efficiency principle because it reduces information
gathering costs, but it is a democratic principle because it makes citizens
the “co-authors of the norms by which they live” – including the norms
22

See, e.g., id. at 88.
See, e.g., Lawrence Waggoner, From Here to Eternity: The Folly of Perpetual
Trusts 10 (Univ. Mich. Law Sch. Scholarship Repository, Working Paper No. 259, 2012).
24 The most thorough discussion of numerus clausus in the common law context
appears in Nestor M. Davidson, Standardization and Pluralism in Property Law, 61
VAND. L. REV. 1597, 1604-05 (2008). See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal
Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L. J. 1,
6 (2000). See also Yun-chien Chang & Henry E. Smith, The Numerus Clausus Principle:
Property, Custom, and the Emergence of New Property Forms, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2275,
2279 (2015); Anna Di Robilant, Property and Democratic Deliberation: The Numerus
Clausus Principle and Democratic Experimentalism in Property Law, 62 AM. J. COMP. L.
367, 368 (2014). For an explanation of this principle in the civil law context, see SJEF VAN
ERP & BRAM AKKERMANS, CASES, MATERIALS AND TEST ON PROPERTY LAW 65-73
(2012).
25 For a discussion of trust law’s failure to apply numerus clausus, see Kent D.
Schenkel, Trust Law and the Title Split: A Beneficial Perspective, 78 UMKC L. REV. 181,
191 (2009).
26 Di Robilant, supra note 24, at 397.
27 Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 773, 793-94 (2001).
28 Avihay Dorfman, Property and Collective Undertaking: The Principle of Numerus
Clausus, 61 U. TORONTO L. J. 467, 509 (2011). See also Robert C. Post, Democracy and
Equality, 25, 33 (Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, Paper No. 177, 2005).
23
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embodied in property law.29 This co-authorship legitimizes society’s
property rules and the human interactions they determine.
Historically, trusts have evaded the NC filter for highly formalistic
reasons: the trust form separates legal from equitable title, and, traditionally, NC has applied only to forms of legal title, ignoring all of the
myriad equitable interests trusts create.30 As I explain below, this distinction makes little sense. I argue that the NC should apply to the beneficial interests of trusts just as it applies to other property forms.
Bringing equitable interests into the NC analysis would change the legal
landscape of trust law and force a much more rational discussion of the
role that trusts play in our society and our estate planning.
This article proceeds in four parts. Part II presents the history of
numerus clausus and explains the two main justifications for it: efficiency and democratic governance. Part III explains why NC should apply to trusts and shows how recent trust forms violate both its principles
of efficiency and of democracy. Part IV explains how NC applies to
trusts. Ultimately, I argue that recent trust proliferation represents the
failure of democratic decision-making about property, a failure we ignore at our peril.
PART II:

NUMERUS CLAUSUS: HISTORY

AND

JUSTIFICATIONS

A. History
Numerus clausus literally means “the number is closed.”31 It limits
the types of property rights in a given legal system to those the legislature authorizes.32 NC has two components: one limits the number of
property rights – i.e., fee simple, defeasible fee, and lease – and the second limits the content of those forms – that is, an easement is limited to
certain common and predictable content.33 Thus, for example, a lease
satisfies the first component by being one of the allowed forms of property rights, but it still may violate the second component by having content which is not allowed – a famous example being a lease “until the
29

Post, supra note 28, at 25.
See Schenkel, supra note 25, at 210.
31 For a general explanation of numerus clausus, see VAN ERP & AKKERMANS,
supra note 24, at 65-73; Dorfman, supra note 28, at 467; Henry Hansmann & Reinier
Kraakman, Property, Contract, And Verification: The Numerus Clausus Problem and The
Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S373, S373-74 (2002); Davidson, supra note 24,
at 1598; Merrill & Smith, supra note 24, at 4.
32 VAN ERP & AKKERMANS, supra note 24, at 65-73; Dorfman, supra note 28, at 468;
Davidson, supra note 24, at 1616; Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 31, at S374; Merrill
& Smith, supra note 24, at 10-11.
33 Chang & Smith, supra note 24, at 2279.
30
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war ends.”34 Or, an easement – a nonpossessory right to use the land of
another – appears on NC but the content of the right must also be allowed (a right of way, yes; a right to charge a fee to transport goods
across the land, no).35
The NC receives explicit mention in civil law cases; American
courts apply it without referring to it specifically.36 An oft-cited American case applying NC is Johnson v. Whiton, in which a will devised land
“to my granddaughter Sarah A. Whiton and her heirs on her father’s
side.”37 Finding that “[a] man cannot create a new kind of inheritance,”
Justice Holmes, writing for the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, ruled that the devise created a fee simple in the devisee.38 American statutory law also expresses NC by implication, as in Uniform
Commercial Code Section 1-203 (distinguishing between security interests and leases).39 American property law applies NC implicitly by limiting property rights to an enumerated list of five: the fee simple
absolute, the defeasible fee simple, the fee tail, the life estate, and the
lease – and, more recently, the condominium, the timeshare.40
The NC does not freeze property interests in time. The legislature
may authorize new forms of property rights as changing times and circumstances require.41 The underlying idea of the principle is not to prevent the evolution of property rights, but rather to prevent them from
proliferating at the whim of private parties.42 For example, the
timeshare and the condominium are two new forms of property ownership which satisfy numerus clausus because they emerged from legislatures – i.e., democratic deliberation – rather than the design of private
parties.43 NC does not work perfectly as an efficiency principle: American property law tolerates many information inefficiencies – discrepancies among different recording systems, for example44 – but NC remains
34

See, e.g., Lace v. Chantler, [1944] 368 K.B.D. 305 (C.A.) 307 (appeal taken from

C.C.).
35

Keppel v. Bailey, [1834] 39 Eng. Rep. 1042, 1042.
Merrill & Smith, supra note 24, at 4.
37 Johnson v. Whiton, 159 Mass. 424, 425 (1893).
38 Id. at 426.
39 U.C.C. § 1-203 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2012). See Juliet M. Moringiello, What Virtual Worlds Can Do for Property Law, 62 FLA. L. REV. 159, 181 n.173
(2010).
40 Merrill & Smith, supra note 24, at 13. Although, as Merrill and Smith note, “Defeasible fees and leases can be further subdivided into subtypes, and the fee tail has been
abolished in nearly all jurisdictions and is for practical purposes defunct.” Id.
41 Id. at 15.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Chad J. Pomeroy, A Theoretical Case for Standardized Vesting Documents, 38
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 957, 976 (2012).
36
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a system for minimizing the costs of these discrepancies, if an imperfect
one.
The rationale for limiting the forms property rights can take – i.e.,
applying NC – to property and not contracts is that property laws bind
parties not in privity with the contracting parties – in fact, everyone else
in society – while contracts do not.45 Parties to a contract are free to
devise whatever contract terms they wish - within the limits of legality
and public policy - because they are the only ones affected by those
terms.46 By contrast, forms of property limit the rights of everyone in
society; they travel with the asset, binding future buyers and sellers, and
potentially, everyone else – without these parties’ consent or even
knowledge.47 In Blackstone’s words, property is “that sole and despotic
dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things
of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the
universe.”48 Thus, the rationale goes, there should be a limit to how
many such forms exist to prevent the rights of third parties from being
undermined in unforeseeable, inefficient and unfair ways.49 This is not
to say that the distinction between contracts and property is always
clear. Some legal relations can be hybrids of contract and property.50
The trust itself is best explained as such a hybrid: it can contain an almost infinite variety of customized terms in the contract between the
trustee and the settlor which control the beneficiary’s interest, but it also
limits the legal interests of third parties not privy to the bargain.51
The early cases explaining the NC base it, at least in part, on efficiency. In the 1834 English case of Keppel v. Bailey, an owner of land
tried to enforce an agreement on subsequent buyers to pay a certain
45 See, e.g., Dorfman, supra note 28, at 490 (observing that property forms allow
owners to impose norms on non-owners); Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 31, at 374
(noting that “[P]roperty rights differ from contract rights by being ‘good against all the
world’”).
46 Daniel Kelly, The Right to Include, 63 EMORY L.J. 857, 918 (2014) (noting that,
“property forms not only bind third parties in ways that contracts cannot”).
47 Id. at 918-19.
48 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2.
49 Merrill & Smith, supra note 24, at 4, 7.
50 See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Property as Institutions for Resources: Lessons from, and
for IP, 94 TEX. L. Rev. 1, 5 (2015) (observing that “some emerging IP arrangements
occupy a hybrid space between property and contract”); Michael A. de Gennaro, The
“Public Trust” Servitude: Creating A Policy-Based Paradigm for Copyright Dispute Resolution and Enforcement, 37 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1131, 1151 (2005) (noting that Servitudes—like copyright term limits—are actually contract-property hybrids); Robert H.
Kelley, Any Reports of the Death of the Property Law Paradigm for Leases Have Been
Greatly Exaggerated, 41 WAYNE L. REV. 1563, 1579 (1999) (stating that tenancies for a
term “today are construed under a hybrid of contract and property law”).
51 Schenkel, supra note 25, at 183.
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price for transporting coal across it.52 The issue in the case was whether
the owner of land could create a burden which would obligate future
buyers of the burdened land with what the court called “novel rights” –
that is, rights which were unprecedented in such transactions and which
no purchaser would likely anticipate attaching to land.53 The Court declined to uphold such burdens, saying
[i]t must not be supposed that incidents of a novel kind can be
devised and attached to property at the fancy and caprice of
any owner. It is clearly inconvenient both to the science of the
law and the public weal that such a latitude should be given.
There can be no harm in allowing the fullest latitude to men in
binding themselves . . . to answer in damages for breach of
their obligations . . . but great detriment would arise and much
confusion of rights if parties were allowed to invent new modes
of holding and enjoying real property.54
The Court’s objection to these “incidents of a novel kind” is that
they would cause much “confusion of rights,” that is, no subsequent
buyers would be sure what burdens they were taking on with the
purchase of the land.55 For this reason, the Court explained the parameters of permissible burdens: a burden that could run with the land –
i.e., pass through the filter of property rights and bind future owners –
had to be “of such a nature as ‘to inhere in the land’ and ‘concern the
demised premises, and the mode of occupying them.’”56 This is the origin of the “touch and concern doctrine,” which means that a burden
which runs with the land must affect how the land is used or occupied.57
This is because such a burden is both more likely to be visible to inspection, and because, in a related vein, it is more likely to fit with expectations of the kind of burden that would likely attach to land.58
Nineteenth century courts in England and the United States invalidated
such easements as walking for pleasure,59 boating for pleasure,60 withdrawing subjacent support,61 opening sluices of a reservoir when its
52

Keppel v. Bailey, [1834] 39 Eng. Rep. 1042, 1045.
Id.
54 Id. at 1049.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 For discussion of the touch and concern doctrine, see generally Ursula Tracy
Doyle, Evidence of Things Not Seen: Divining Balancing Factors from Kiobel’s Touch
and Concern Test, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 443, 445 (2015).
58 Keppel v. Bailey, [1834] 39 Eng. Rep. 1042, 1049.
59 Dyce v. Hay, [1852] 1 Macq. H. L. Cas. 299, 303-04.
60 Hill v. Tupper, [1863] 159 Eng. Rep. 51, 53.
61 Richards v. Harper, [1866] L. R. 1 EX. 199, 204.
53
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level rises dangerously,62 and maintaining bathhouses,63 because, as one
of the opinions observed, “[n]one of the cases cited are at all analogous
[to] this, and some authority must be produced before we can hold that
such a right can be created.”64
The burden in the Keppel case – an agreement to pay a specified
price for transporting material over the land – did not meet this “analogous” requirement; nor was it tied closely enough to the actual use of
the land.65 A burden not closely tied to the use of the land would be a
“novel fancy” and enforcing it would wreak havoc on both “the science
of law and the public weal.”66 Because the rights sought to be enforced
were “novel” there was a notice problem: no subsequent buyer who was
not privy to the contract would have had any reason to suspect such an
agreement.67 Second, the Court seemed to fear that allowing such
agreements to run with the land would choke off commerce in land:
potential buyers would be discouraged by the possibility that any land
they bought might be encumbered by a vast array of unpredictable obligations, making it unattractive as an investment.68 These factors speak
to information-gathering costs and notice: potential buyers should be
able to discern what burdens they were taking on with the land, and
those that were too “novel” would be too hard to discover – if they were
discovered at all.
NC governs leases as well.69 American leases fall into four recognized types: the term of years, the periodic tenancy, the tenancy at will,
and the tenancy at sufferance.70 A lease “for the duration of the war,”
for instance, would almost certainly not be enforced according to its
terms.71 Seeking to place such a lease within one of the four recognized
“boxes” of ownership, a court would probably shoehorn the lease into
the category of periodic tenancy or a tenancy at will.72 There is no such
thing as a lifetime lease at common law, so such an interest would fall
62

Simpson v. Mayor of Godmanchester [1896] 1 Ch. 214, 220.
Eckert v. Peters, 36 A. 491, 492 (N.J. Ch. 1897).
64 Hill, 159 Eng. Rep. at 53.
65 Keppel v. Bailey, [1834] 39 Eng. Rep. 1042, 1053.
66 Id. at 1049.
67 Id. at 1048.
68 Id. at 1049.
69 Pomeroy, supra note 44, at 976.
70 ROBERT S. SCHOSHINSKI, AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT §§ 2:12:26, pp. 30-83 (1980); DAVID A. THOMAS, 4 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 39.02(c),
at 492 (1994).
71 SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 70, §§ 2:1-2:26; THOMAS, supra note 70, § 39.02(c).
72 But cf. Garner v. Gerrish, 473 N.E.2d 223, 225 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1984) (characterizing an interest as a “life tenancy terminable at the will of the tenant”).
63
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outside the recognized categories and so constitute a departure from the
NC.73
Changing times require changing property forms, and the NC does
not hinder this evolution: as industrialization in the United States continued apace, American courts steadily expanded the list of permissible
easements to include, among other things, conservation easements,
newly necessitated by encroachments on the land.74 The basic principle,
however, remained: limiting the burdens that can be passed on to third
parties to those already in existence or codified by the legislature
through a democratic process.
B. Justifications
Contemporary scholarship falls into two schools of thought about
the justifications for numerus clausus: the efficiency rationale and the
democratic decision-making rationale.
1. Efficiency
The most notable spokespeople for the efficiency school are Merrill
and Smith, who argue that limiting property forms reduces information
gathering costs – i.e., the cost of finding out what burdens attach to a
particular asset thus enabling efficient - i.e., low-cost - market transactions.75 If property forms were infinitely variable, the list of burdens
could be endless, and the costs of ascertaining them for any given form
of ownership would be prohibitive and thus reduce efficiency.76 Merrill
and Smith give an example of a watch whose use is limited to Mondays
(an example to which I shall return).77 A potential buyer of such a
watch would have to spend considerable resources to discover this odd
(novel?) limitation on the watch’s use; this is why idiosyncratic forms of
property ownership make market transactions prohibitively costly.78
73 Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Kalis, 191 F.2d 739, 740 (8th Cir. 1951); Stanmeyer v.
Davis, 53 N.E.2d 22, 23 (Ill. App. Ct. 1944); Lace v. Chantler, [1944] 368 K.B.D. 305
(C.A.) 306 (appeal taken from C.C.). But cf. Smith’s Transfer & Storage Co. v. Hawkins,
50 A.2d 267, 268 (D.C. 1946) (concluding that a term of years requires only that the lease
be certain to end, not that it have a definite calendar ending, and thus that a tenancy until
the termination of “the present war” was a term of years).
74 For the history of conservation easements, see generally Connie Kertz, Conservation Easements at the Crossroads, 34 REAL EST. L.J. 139, 141 (2005).
75 The most prominent statement of this thesis is Merrill & Smith, supra note 24, at
33.
76 Id. at 40.
77 Id. at 27.
78 Id.
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Limiting the list of property forms to a small number of known possibilities lowers the buyer’s cost.79
In a related vein, the cost of providing notice in such a complex
system would be equally prohibitive, with the same result.80 Hansmann
and Kraakman argue that NC aids the potential purchaser of property
rights to verify the content of those rights as part of a market transaction.81 Moreover, the duty to understand property rights is not personal, that is, it is not limited to those involved in the transaction.82
Rather, it is the duty of everyone in the society to understand property
rights and to arrange their economic plans accordingly, so efficiency
concerns are relevant society at large83
2. Democratic Decision-Making About Property
Several writers have pointed to another, compatible rationale for
NC – namely, democratic decision-making about property rights. Joseph Singer, Avihay Dorfman and Anna Di Robilant all connect NC to
democratic decision-making and property’s role in ensuring individual
freedom. Dorfman in particular focusses on the rationale of democratic
decision-making about property:84 He argues that it goes to the heart of
the legitimacy of political authority85 and uses it to explain the how laws
exert authority and engender obedience.86 According to Dorfman,
there are two models to explain this effect, the liberal model and the
republican model.87 The liberal model bases the legitimacy of authority
on the appeal to reason: “[l]iberals demand that social order should in
principle be capable of explaining itself at the tribunal of each person’s
understanding.”88 The republican model rests authority on the democratic process: because the members of society have faith in the fairness
79

Id. at 33.
See, e.g., id. at 69 (arguing that, “by permitting a significant number of different
forms of property but forbidding courts to recognize new ones, the numerus clausus
strikes a balance between the proliferation of property forms, on the one hand, and excessive rigidity on the other”).
81 Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 31, at 374.
82 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 24, at 26-27.
83 Pomeroy, supra note 44, at 983; Merrill & Smith, supra note 24, at 25-26.
84 See generally Dorfman, supra note 28, at 468.
85 Avihay Dorfman, Freedom of Religion, 21 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 279, 290 (2008).
86 There is, of course, a vast literature on this subject. See, e.g., id.
87 Id. at 290-95.
88 Jeremy Waldron, Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism, 37 PHIL. Q. 127, 149
(1987); see also JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE INCLUSION OF THE OTHER: STUDIES IN POLITICAL THEORY 100 (Ciaran Cronin & Pablo De Greif ed. 1998) (“Moral commands [extending, in Habermasian terminology, to principles of political-moral conduct] must be
internally related to the life-plans and lifestyles of affected persons in a way they can
grasp for themselves.”).
80
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and transparency of the political process, even the dissenter whose views
do not prevail in a given set of circumstances respects and obeys the
law.89
Under either of these models, decision-making about property
rights must carry legitimacy. Because property rights, unlike contract
rights, affect everyone in society, the only forum that should be able to
create new ones is a democratically elected legislature, in a process
which must be able to “explain itself at the tribunal of each person’s
reason,” and/or receive the input of the whole spectrum of social interests and groups.90 Thus, NC legitimates government by guaranteeing
that forms of ownership which affect everyone will be created only
through the process of democratic decision-making.91 As Dorfman explains, it is “a categorical restriction on private legislation”92 in the area
of property rights; it is an affirmation that, for government to have legitimacy, forms of property must be the products of collective decisionmaking which reflects the input of all whom they obligate.93
Joseph Singer broadens the purpose of NC by arguing that the system of estates not only fosters efficiency, but also “shape[s] social life in
a manner consistent with the normative commitments of a democratic
society composed of free and equal individuals who treat each other
respectfully.”94 He explains that “[p]roperty law therefore both reflects
and puts into practice value judgments about the appropriate contours
of social, economic, and political life.”95 I would include in this the idea
that the doctrine of NC limits the burdens which can be imposed on
third parties to those that comport with social expectations and fairness.
In other words, NC – what Singer calls the system of estates – controls
the proliferation of property rights in accordance with the principles and
expectations of a democratic society whose market actors are expected
to treat one another with decency and respect.96 Singer illustrates this
notion with the examples of Fair Housing laws, consumer protection
laws, and the Economic Recovery Act of 2008, which allowed homeowners to renegotiate their mortgages.97 The basic idea the estate system embodies, in Singer’s view, is that property ownership comes with
89

For an account of this theme in the American context, see ROBERT POST, CONSTIDOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT 185-86 (1995).
90 Dorfman, supra note 28, at 483.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Joseph William Singer, Democratic Estates: Property Law in a Free and Democratic Society, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1009, 1052 (2009).
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id.
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responsibility toward others in society, and property use must conform
the basic expectations about market interactions.98
Anna Di Robilant similarly justifies the NC by referring to democratic decision-making.99 Affirming that property rights have an “inherent public quality,” because they impose duties on non-owners, she
asserts, like Singer and Dorfman, that they must be the product of democratic deliberation.100 But she goes on to credit the principle with allowing for significant experimentation in property, in a process by which
citizens develop new property forms to respond to emerging social concerns and then submit them to legislative approval.101 As examples of
ownership forms which this process has produced, Robilant cites Common Interest Communities, Community Land Trusts, and the public
trust doctrine in the United States, as well as several emergent property
forms in the E.U.102
PART III:

APPLYING NC

TO

TRUSTS

A. Rationale for Applying NC to the Equitable Interests of Trusts
As noted, trusts have traditionally evaded the NC filter. This has
been the result of overly formalistic thinking: traditionally, NC paid attention only to legal title.103 The trust, as a formal matter, functions by
separating legal title, which vests in the trustee, from beneficial title,
which vests in the beneficiary.104 The trustee exercises legal title by
managing and distributing the trust assets, and the beneficiary exercise
beneficial title by enjoying, using or disposing of the assets.105 Merrill
and Smith do not see limiting NC to the legal title part of the trust as
presenting information cost problems because, they assert, third parties
“deal only with the underlying trust assets which are held by the trustee
in fee simple.”106
This analysis, however, allows formalism to obscure reality. As
Professor Schenkel points out, “trust beneficiaries also engage in market
transactions.”107 Schenkel goes on to build on Merrill and Smith’s
watch analogy to illustrate this point: suppose A transferred the Monday
watch to a trust which gave B the right to use the watch only on Mon98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107

Id.
Di Robilant, supra note 24, at 369.
Id. at 370.
Id. at 369-70.
Id. at 373-87.
Schenkel, supra note 25, at 190-91.
DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 18, at 393-96.
Id.
Merrill & Smith, supra note 24, at 34.
Schenkel, supra note 25, at 210.
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days, and suppose the beneficiary sought to offer the watch as collateral
for a loan.108 Wouldn’t third parties doing business with B face information costs in ascertaining what B’s interest in the watch actually was?109
Because equitable interests affect third parties as much as legal interests, if the rationale of NC is to reduce information gathering costs, NC
should apply to them as well.
The concepts of developed by Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld in his article Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning illustrate how trust interests affect the property rights of others.110
Hohfeld grouped legal relations into what he called “jural correlatives”
and “jural opposites.”111 Hohfeld’s system of correlatives establishes
that any time a person has a right, there is a person with a duty which
corresponds to that right.112 In other words, if person A has a right to a
payment of X dollars from person B, B has a duty to pay those X dollars
to A.113 Likewise, the fact that one person has a privilege means that
another has what Hohfeld referred to as “no-right;” power in one corresponds to a liability in another, and so on.114 Thus, each legal interest,
or right, also has an opposite burden, or “no-right.”115 That B in the
above example has a duty to pay A means that B does not have the
privilege to avoid that payment. Or: Y has a privilege to enter Y’s own
land, and therefore D, for example, has the corresponding “no-right” to
prevent Y from doing so. That Y has a privilege means that Y could not
have a duty (privilege’s jural opposite) to refrain from entering Y’s land.
Hohfeld’s analysis makes clear how the equitable interests of trusts
burden third-party property rights. Every right of the beneficiary – say,
to withhold her interest from creditors – creates of corresponding “noright” in the creditor to collect. DAPTs do this more egregiously: the
settlor’s right to withhold his assets from creditors (as in a DAPT) creates the creditor’s “no right;” the settlor’s right to keep his assets free of
spousal claims – whether arising from divorce or death – creates a noright in the spouse to what would otherwise be marital property. More
broadly, the settlor’s right to keep her assets tax-free in a dynasty trust
imposes a “no-right” on everyone else – in this case, “no right” to keep
similar assets tax free. Rather, the DAPT settlor’s right burdens every108

Id. at 212.
Id.
110 This section is indebted to Kent D. Schenkel’s insightful analysis in Trust Law
and the Title Split: A Beneficial Perspective, supra note 25, at 183.
111 Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in
Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 30 (1914).
112 Id. at 32.
113 See id.
114 See id. at 32-33, 44.
115 See id. at 30-38.
109

Winter 2017]

DEMOCRACY AND TRUSTS

325

one else with the “no right” of either paying higher taxes or living with
unsafe roads and contaminated water.
Perhaps voluntary creditors - banks, credit card companies, etc. –
who also do business with trust beneficiaries – are able to protect themselves through due diligence: surely, they can investigate the resources
of potential borrowers to ascertain the nature of their assets and can
ascertain the existence of trusts which might bar recovery. This is not
always the case in reality, however: some states’ statutes of limitations
for raising fraudulent transfer claims are so short (i.e. 120 days for transfers to DAPTs in Utah116) that a debtor could quickly become judgment
proof four months after sending notice to creditors.117
These Hohfeldian “no-rights” are very real. For example, while
many states have traditionally made exceptions to spendthrift trusts for
certain so-called “super creditors,” like ex-spouses and children with
support orders, the new generation of DAPTs shrinks these exceptions
considerably. Utah, for example, bars all claims against the assets of a
DAPT including those for court-ordered child and spousal support,118 as
does Nevada.119 Similarly, Alaska law bars challenges to transfers made
to a DAPT to avoid support claims,120 and it only allows a child support
creditor to reach trust assets if the payment is 30 days overdue at the
time the trust is created.121 This is also the case with Hawaii DAPT
law.122 Indeed, avoidance of child support and other forms of family
obligations are one of the selling points of DAPTs: a Nevada Trust Company, for example, touts that state as “the only state that includes exspouse and child support creditors in those who may not gain access to
protected assets in an Asset Protection Trust,” which it advertises as “an
incredibly significant benefit.”123
These trust forms impair the property rights of spouses and children
arising from marriage: the marital relation gives them certain rights to
marital property (whether in the form of support or asset division)
which these trusts limit or obliterate. The effect on spousal and child
support creates, in effect, a servitude which impairs these property interests – without the holders’ knowledge or consent.
116
117

115 UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-6-502(9)(b) (2017). Id.
§ 25-6-502(3).
119 NEV. REV. STAT. § 166.120 (2017).
120 ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110 (2017) (listing exception creditors).
121 § 34.40.110(b)(4).
122 HAW. REV. STAT. § 554G-9(1) (2017).
123 Provident Tr. Grp., What is an Asset Protection Trust?, TRUSTPROVIDENT.COM,
https://trustprovident.com/trust-escrow-services/asset-protection-trust (last visited June
21, 2017).
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Surviving spouses to whom state succession law guarantees a portion of the decedent’s estate at death similarly may have their property
rights turned into “no-rights” when a trust is involved. In Bongaards v.
Millen, for example, a mother established a trust for her own benefit
and then upon her death, for that of her daughter.124 After the mother’s
death, the daughter also had a power of appointment over the trust assets, as well as the power to terminate the trust and distribute the assets
to herself.125 The daughter died, leaving nothing to her husband in her
will.126 The husband exercised his right under state law to elect against
the will, and argued that the trust assets should be subject to the elective
share.127 The court disagreed, and refused to include the trust assets in
the estate because the trust had been created by the wife’s mother and
not by the wife herself.128
This result makes little sense, since the wife had had the power at
all times to distribute the trust assets to herself, either by using the
power of appointment or by simply terminating the trust.129 The legalequitable title split distracted the court from the reality that the wife’s
interest in the trust impacted the husband’s property rights as guaranteed by state law. The result in this case clearly contradicts settled trust
law, which states that a general power of appointment is an ownership
interest in the donee.130 But this is not the point. Courts are prone to
making this mistake when they elevate the interests of the dead settlor
(here, the mother) over that of the living. Moreover, the problem is
more acute with DAPTs, which estate planners advertise as a mechanism to avoid the elective share, even when the domicile state’s law
would count the assets of a more traditional trust in the decedent’s
estate.131
Other benefits attached to trust assets impact the property rights of
society at large. Many dynasty trusts exempt their assets from taxation,
124

Bongaards v. Millen, 793 N.E.2d. 335, 337 (Mass. 2003).
Id. at 337-38.
126 Id. at 338.
127 Id. at 340-41.
128 Id. at 341.
129 For a detailed critique of Bongaards and similar cases, see Schenkel, supra note
25, at 199-203.
130 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS, Introductory Note to Chapter 25 (Powers of Appointment), pp. 1812-13 (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
131 Thomas D. Begley, Jr., Protecting your Assets from Creditors: Are you BulletProof? Part 3, BEGLEY LAW GROUP, http://www.begleylawyer.com/2015/01/protectingyour-assets-from-creditors-are-you-bullet-proof-part-3/ (last visited June 21, 2017) (“Delaware law does not defer to the decedent’s domicile to determine the surviving spouse’s
elective share rights, so it is likely that the Delaware DAPT would offer protection
against elective share rights even if the grantor of the trust was a resident of New Jersey
or Pennsylvania.”).
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thus burdening all other members of society with the additional obligation – “no-right” - of either increased tax burden or reduced public
goods and services.132 As a state citizen, my only choice is between the
burden of paying higher taxes to make up the shortfall or driving on
unpaved roads.
The shift of tax burden is substantial. A 2003 study estimated that
the amount of capital these trusts shelter from taxes was around one
hundred billion (then),133 and, because of the invisibility of private trust
companies, this may drastically undervalue the true amount.134 What
this means is that settlors and beneficiaries of these trusts avoid their
obligations to participate in a progressive tax system, leaving others to
foot the bill, or do without. Dynasty trust beneficiaries’ “right” to avoid
taxes triggers an obligation on the part of everyone else to make up the
difference.
So at the new millennium we have one old and two new forms of
trust which burden the rights of third parties by protecting their beneficiaries – and now settlors – from the claims of individuals and of society
at large. Whether one justifies NC on efficiency or democracy grounds,
there is no basis for leaving the equitable interests of trusts out of the
calculation. Trust create benefits which in turn burden third parties, and
it is time property law acknowledged this reality.
Defenders of these trusts do not deny that they affect the rights of
third parties, in essence binding them in ways they never agreed to.135
Rather, they claim that these externalities are not significantly harmful,
and/or that settlors of the trusts can achieve the same effects through
other property forms. For example, Adam Hirsch lists such devices as
tenancies by the entirety, voluntary contributions to an ERISA pension
fund, re-titling non-exempt property as exempt, forming a family limited
132 For a discussion of the tax avoidance strategies of dynasty and other kind of
trusts, see generally Iris J. Goodwin, How the Rich Stay Rich: Using a Family Trust Company to Secure a Family Fortune, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 467, 468 (2010) (exposing “the
role of the family trust company as the masterstroke in a series of aggressing planning
techniques . . . that are used by the very wealthy to secure and grow a fortune for untold
generations to come”).
133 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 112TH CONG., DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT’S FISCAL YEAR 2012 BUDGET PROPOSAL 522, 528
(2011).
134 RAY D. MADOFF, IMMORTALITY AND THE LAW: THE RISING POWER OF THE
AMERICAN DEAD 76-84 (2010) (describing dynasty trusts and the evolving treatment of
them).
135 For examples of criticism in this vein, see Adam S. Hofri-Winogradow, The Stripping of the Trust: From Evolutionary Scripts to Distributive Results, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 529,
531 (2014); Schenkel, supra note 1, at 69 (observing that trusts can increase insurance
costs); Stewart E. Sterk, Jurisdictional Competition to Abolish the Rule Against Perpetuities: R.I.P. for the R.A.P, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 2097, 2115 (2003).
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partnership, using an offshore asset protection trust, or making “gifts”
to “trusted family members” as devices people can use to avoid future
creditors.136 This is all true (although the gift to the “trusted family
member” has backfired more than once, when the relative has turned
out to be more avaricious than trustworthy).137
None of these possible mechanisms, however, undermines my point
with respect to NC: these are all forms of property ownership which
have gained legal acceptance, thus (theoretically at least) passing the
NC test. They are all forms of ownership which at least have the imprimatur of democratic decision-making: tenancies by the entirety
emerged from the impulse to protect marital property;138 ERISA rules
serve to shelter retirement savings, a public good;139 exempt property is
intended to prevent destitution in cases of bankruptcy or other financial
catastrophe;140 and the initial impulse for the corporation, at least, was a
democratic one: to enable small investors to buy shares in companies
without risking devastating liability for their debts.141 This is not to
paint an overly rosy picture of any of these entities and the various interest groups which had a hand in their formation. But these forms
achieved broad-based benefits – protection of retirement savings for
millions of workers, the possibility of investing and earning interest to
the middle class, because they arose from a clash of interest groups re136 Adam J. Hirsch, Fear Not the Asset Protection Trust, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2685,
2695 (2006).
137 Id. at 2696, 2701. As Dukeminier and Sitkoff put it, “as any lawyer knows, these
transferors are asking for trouble, and, human nature being what it is, they usually get it.”
DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 18, at 434. They go on to cite the case of Pappas v.
Pappas, 320 A.2d 809 (Conn. 1973), in which a 67-year-old man married a 23-year-old
woman while on a visit to Greece. After they returned, trouble ensued, and, shortly
before the wife filed for divorce, Mr. Pappas transferred certain assets to his son, who
agreed to return everything once the divorce was final. At that point, however, the son
refused to return the assets, and the court refused to impose a constructive trust because
it held that the father, in perpetrating a fraud on the court, had unclean hands.
138 See generally John D. Johnston, Jr., Sex and Property: The Common Law Tradition, the Law School Curriculum, and Developments Toward Equality, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1033, 1083 (1972) (discussing history of tenancies by the entirety).
139 Donald T. Bogan, ERISA: The Savings Clause, § 502 Implied Preemption, Complete Preemption, And State Law Remedies, 42 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 105, 181 (2001)
(discussing Congressional policy purpose for ERISA).
140 Michael Denham, Comment, A Call for Bankruptcy Reform: The Fifth Circuit
Limits the Texas Homestead Exemption and Further Complicates the Exemption Controversy, 30 TEX. TECH L. REV. 269, 272 (1999) (noting that “[e]xemptions allow a debtor to
maintain “property necessary for his physical survival).
141 See, e.g., Judith Schenck Koffler, The Bankruptcy Clause and Exemption Laws: A
Reexamination of the Doctrine of Geographic Uniformity, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 22, 24-25 n.
8 (1983) (describing the history of property exemptions under federal bankruptcy laws).
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sulting in compromise.142 By contrast, the rise of DAPTs has not resulted from any such clash. Rather, it has been the result of one-sided
lobbying by a small segment of society without input from the large
group of citizens affected by it. This cannot pass democratic muster.
If we apply the NC to trusts, do they fulfil its mandate, either by
enhancing efficiency or by embodying democratic decision-making?
B. Efficiency
So far, those promoting the efficiency rationale for NC have largely
ignored or brushed aside the problem of trusts.143 This may be because
of confinement to the real property paradigm: real property in trust
presents less of a problem in terms of notice and transaction costs. The
transfer of real property requires a deed, and the deed indicates the existence of the trust (although not necessarily the terms of the trust.)144
So, the efficiency rationale of NC (that it reduces information-gathering
costs) makes some sense with respect to real property (although the
great variance among the three thousand U.S. counties in terminology
and property forms undermines its effectiveness).145
The majority of private trusts today, however, consist of assets
other than real property – money, stocks and bonds, etc.146 Unlike
deeds to real property and wills, which are publicly recorded, trusts are
completely private instruments. This is one of the advantages they offer
to those seeking to avoid the public disclosure of probate. If one leaves
property to a trust in a will, then the existence of the trust is in a public
record, but if a settlor transfers her estate to a trust during life – a “living trust” – the instrument will likely remain private. There is no public
registry of trusts in the United States.147 Federal law requires banks
142 Donald T. Bogan, ERISA: The Savings Clause, § 502 Implied Preemption, Complete Preemption and State Law Remedies, 42 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 105, 117 (2002)
(“As might be expected with such an ample piece of legislation affecting the rights and
obligations of both big business and labor, ERISA also reflects the reality of political
compromise.”).
143 See, e.g., Merrill & Smith, supra note 24, at 54.
144 DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 18, at 440-41.
145 For a discussion of the differences among counties in terminology, see generally
Pomeroy, supra note 44, at 961.
146 Goodwin, supra note 132, at 471-72.
147 There is one in the European Union; it lists settlors, trustees and beneficial interest holders of EU trusts, and is open to national officials responsible for anti-money
laundering and tax evasion efforts. See Directive (EU) 2015/849, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the Prevention of the Use of the Financial
System for the Purposes of Money Laundering or Terrorist Financing, Amending Regulation (EU) No. 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing
Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission
Directive 2006/70/EC(1), available at THE OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
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which manage trusts to make reports about the assets they control, but
private trust companies, which represent a growing trend among the
wealthy, are under no such obligations.148 According to Hoover’s Online, there are as of this writing, 22,000 private trust companies in the
United States.149 Uncovering the interest holders and determining the
terms of the trust under private management – important information
for putative creditors – can be daunting, or impossible. Indeed, one of
the main reasons the wealthy create these companies in the first place is
to keep their assets and affairs confidential.150 This undermines the efficiency rationale by making information about the assets – or even their
very existence – costly to uncover.
One might argue that it should be obvious that any trust in question
has a spendthrift clause, which is boilerplate in most trusts today,151 thus
avoiding the cost of analyzing a particular instrument. But this assumption would offer limited help: trust instruments can contain almost infinite variations on the theme of which creditors may receive payment out
of trust assets. For example, states have differing rules about what creditors constitute an exception to spendthrift prohibitions: some states allow for ex-spouses,152 some for suppliers of necessaries;153 some allow
for attachment of assets if the distribution exceeds what the beneficiary
needs to maintain her “station in life.”154 This wide variety of trusts,
each with different sets of creditor rights, makes it difficult for third parties to assess whether to extend credit to trust beneficiaries, and also
makes it difficult for creditors to decide whether to seek enforcement.
This could add considerably to the information costs associated with
these decisions.
§ 4, ch. III, art. 31.1(a)-(e), eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:JOL_
2015_141_R.
148 Alan V. Ytterberg & James P. Weller, Managing Family Wealth Through a Private Trust Company, 36 ACTEC L.J. 623, 625 (2010).
149 D&B HOOVERS, http://www.hoovers.com/ (last visited June 21, 2017); e-mail from
Ryan Splenda, Bus. & Econ. Librarian, Carnegie Mellon U., to Timothy Gatton, Head of
Ref. Servs. & Law Library Prof., Chickasaw Nation Law Library (Jul. 13, 2016, 10:54
EST) (on file with author).
150 Todd Ganos, Wealthy Families Create Private Trust Companies for Privacy, Protection, Tax Savings, and Control, FORBES (Oct. 28, 2013), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
toddganos/2015/10/28/wealthy-families-create-private-trust-companies-for-privacy-pro
tection-tax-savings-and-control/#3a476363713e.
151 Thomas P. Gallanis, The New Direction of American Trust Law, 97 IOWA L. REV.
215, 228 (2011) (noting that “most modern trusts contain a boilerplate spendthrift
clause”) (emphasis added).
152 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 503 (b)(1) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010).
153 § 503 (b)(2).
154 See, e.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 7-3.4 (McKinney 2017).

Winter 2017]

DEMOCRACY AND TRUSTS

331

C. The Failure of the Democratic Process
Sadly, the ideal of property forms emerging from democratic decision-making presents an overly rosy picture of the legislative process in
the United States. The increasing influence of money in elections and of
the power of lobbyists and special interest groups raises concerns that
new forms of property ownership voted in by a legislature might be
more responsive to the interests of those members of society with assets,
connections and influence than to those of society at large.155 The
proliferation of new forms of trusts passed by state legislatures in the
past decade implicates some of the concerns underlying the NC in the
first place, despite their appearance of democratic legitimacy by virtue
of having passed through a democratically elected body.156
The legislative process for making determinations about dynasty
and asset protection trusts does not embody the ideals put forth by the
proponents of deliberative democratic decision-making. Despite being
passed by legislatures, these new forms of property ownership often are
not the products of democratic decision-making. To the contrary, the
rush by state legislatures to repeal the rule against perpetuities and pass
dynasty trusts has been the result of lobbying by the wealthy, their lawyers, bankers, and trust managers,157 at times in the face of popular rejection of these innovations.158
Typically, the special interests who stand to benefit from these new
trusts control the drafting, introduction and debate about them. For example, the Maine dynasty trust bill passed “after a lopsided debate
whose key contributors were members of the banking lobby and attorneys in private practice who stood to gain the most from its passage.”159
155 For investigations of the role of lobbying and money on legislatures, see, for example, Lynda Powell, How Money Talks in State Legislatures, WASHINGTON POST, Nov.
5, 2013, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2013/11/05/the-influence
-of-money-in-u-s-politics/?utm_term=.d54c1f9c5cbe (analyzing the mechanics of donor
influence on the drafting and progress of legislation). See also DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF,
supra note 18, at 705 (asserting that “[l]ocal bankers and lawyers, who stand to gain from
an influx of trust assets, have lobbied for [APTs and dynasty trusts”]).
156 The leading analysis of interjurisdictional competition for trust business is Robert
H. Sitkoff & Max M. Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competition for Trust Funds: An Empirical Analysis of Perpetuities and Taxes, 115 YALE L.J. 356, 356 (2005).
157 See, e.g., Grayson M. P. McCouch, Who Killed the Rule against Perpetuities? 40
PEPP. L. REV. 1291, 1292 (2013) (noting in 2013 that, “in the space of less than twenty
years, at least half the states, responding to intense lobbying by lawyers, bankers, and
financial planners, have enacted statutes authorizing perpetual trusts, with the express
goal of attracting trust business from other states”).
158 Steven J. Horowitz & Robert H. Sitkoff, Unconstitutional Perpetual Trusts, 67
VAND. L. REV. 1769, 1773 (2014).
159 Chris Stevenson, Maine’s Dynasty Trust Statute: The Product of an Informed
Judgment, 23 ME. B. J. 224, 230 (2008).
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Nevada offers another example of this lack of democratic process: when
proponents of perpetual trusts in that state held a state-wide referendum to repeal the state constitution’s anti-perpetuity provision, voters
rejected it by a margin of sixty percent.160 Nonetheless, the state legislature passed a law – drafted by a committee which included members of
a Nevada trusts and estates law firm161 - allowing trusts to endure for
365 years.162 In Michigan, the Greenleaf Trust Company, represented
by a local law firm, seems to have “spearheaded” the passage of perpetual trusts in that state.163 According to the webpage of Dykema, a
Michigan law firm, one of its partners was the “primary draftsperson” of
the domestic asset protection trust legislation passed by the Michigan
legislature in December 2016.164 In Connecticut, local banks and lawyers argued that “people who want to set up dynastic trusts for their
grandchildren, great-grandchildren and down the line of generations,
are doing them in other states.”165 Indeed, the lawyer who headed the
lobbying efforts in the Connecticut Legislature reported that at the
hearing on the perpetual trusts bill “a kind of bidding war ensued as
legislators extended the time period from 90 to 100 to 360 years, finally
ending at a 2000 year period limitations.”166 The New Jersey legislature
passed the Trust Modernization Bill overturning the ban on perpetuities
which was sponsored by the New Jersey Bankers Association.167 There
have also been efforts, so far unsuccessful, to repeal state constitutional
bans on perpetuities in North Carolina and Texas.168 As Sitkoff and
Horowitz note, “lawyers and bankers have lobbied for perpetual trusts
to attract, or at least retain, trust business.”169
160

Election 2002, RENO GAZETTE, Nov. 8, 2002, at 3C.
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162 NEV. REV. STAT. § 111.1031(1)(b) (2017).
163 Warner Norcross & Judd, LLP, Building A Dynasty: Michigan Law Now Allows
Perpetual Trusts, WNJ.COM (Nov. 26, 2008), http://www.wnj.com/Publications/BuildingA-Dynasty-Michigan-Law-Now-Allows-PerpetualTrusts (last visited June 21, 2017).
164 Michigan’s New Asset Protection Trusts, DYKEMA (Dec. 14, 2016), http://www.dy
kema.com/resources-alerts-michigans-new-asset-protection-trusts_12-13-2016.html (last
visited June 21, 2017).
165 Thomas Scheffey, Is Immortality Just Around the Corner? “Dead Hand” Trust
Law Relaxes Its Grip, CONN. L. TRIB., Feb. 28, 2002, at 10 (quoting “veteran estate tax
specialist” Frank S. Berall).
166 Id.
167 Rachel Wolcott, New Jersey Poised to Allow Dynasty Trusts, PRIV. ASSET MGMT.,
May 17, 1999, at 6, 10.
168 See S.B. 398, 2011 Gen. Assemb. (N.C. 2011) (North Carolina); Ashley Vaughan,
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Perpetuities, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 615, 637-39 (2006) (Texas).
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The problem of interest group capture is, of course, not unique to
this area of law.170 As long as politicians need vast sums of money to
win elections, and as long as soft money flowing into campaigns is unlimited, the undemocratic influence of interest groups on legislatures is
almost a given. The legislation of trusts and estates, however, is especially vulnerable to closed door dealmaking: it isn’t an area of law which
garners much media attention and hardly ever makes headlines; most
people are unaware of it and uninterested in it.171 This allows the new
trust forms to emerge hidden from public scrutiny. Ray Madoff calls
this “the stealth nature”172 of changes to trust law: “The larger picture
has gone unnoticed because change has occurred within [discrete] areas
of the law, and often at the state level.”173 As Mark Ascher elaborates,
[w]hen the relevant committee of the local bar association recommends a package of proposed changes to the probate code,
no bells begin to ring and no warning lights begin to flash. The
committee states truthfully that it has vetted the proposed
changes with all of the ‘relevant’ groups, like the local bankers’
and accountants’ groups, and the legislature rubber-stamps the
changes, probably without hearings.174
Madoff sums up the process this way:
Finally, the story of the American law of the dead would not
be complete without recognition of the effect of money on legislation. It is significant that the areas in which American law
has grown most dramatically . . . not only appeal to individuals’
desire to exert posthumous control but also appreciably benefit
corporate interests. By using interests of the dead as a decoy,
these entities have succeeded in enriching their own property
interests. Although financial gain may be the driving force behind these changes, corporations are not the ultimate villains.
Businesses are amoral, simply doing what our society tells
them to do: maximize profit. The blame lies with legislators,
who have responded to corporate demands even when they
have not best served the needs of American society at large.175
As Sitkoff and Schanzenbach suggest, local interest groups such as
banks, members of the estate planning bar, and trustees, “benefit from,
170
171
172
173
174
175
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MADOFF, supra note 134, at 155.
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Mark L. Ascher, Book Review, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1149, 1174 (2011).
MADOFF, supra note 134, at 155-56.
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and hence lobby for” laws that increase the state’s trust business.176 Indeed, “abolition of the [Rule against Perpetuities] has been ‘pushed by
banking associations . . . [that] wish to remain competitive with banks
where perpetual trusts are permitted.’”177 The annual trustees’ commissions alone are worth about one billion dollars.178 In short, Sitkoff and
Schanzenbach’s empirical study concluded that “[t]he story of jurisdictional competition in trust law is a story of successful lobbying by local
banks and trust lawyers, the principal beneficiaries of attracting new
trust business to the state.”179 The story of the genesis of the Alaska
dynasty trust illustrates Sterk’s point that “[j]urisdictions seeking to become trust havens . . . appear content to draw business to local financial
institutions and lawyers, even without direct benefit to the public
fisc.”180
The proliferation of these instruments underlines both American
law’s drift away from the NC principle – and thus from democratic decision-making in property law - as well as the principle’s importance.
These new trust instruments serve the needs of wealthy families by allowing for the multi-generational accumulation of wealth and the interests of banks, fund managers and trusts and estates attorneys who profit
from their creation and management. They offer a prime example of
how legislative capture can negate the NC principle, and, ironically, why
it and the democratic decision-making about property it seeks to preserve are important for social welfare.
Nor do these new forms of trust benefit society at large by increasing state tax revenue or employment, although it is a common assumption that states compete for business to bolster the tax base.181 Rather,
these trusts are situated in states which have no income tax: Sitkoff and
176 Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, supra note 156, at 363. The Congressional GST exemption was the result of the lobbying efforts of the Gallos, the California winemaking family, who donated $324,000 to ensure that the GST exemption was part of the 1986 tax
reform bill. FRED S. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT EXTRACTION, AND POLITICAL EXTORTION 2 (1997).
177 Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, supra note 156, at 374 (quoting JESSE DUKEMINIER &
STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 854 (6th ed. 2000)).
178 Id. at 411.
179 Id. at 417.
180 Stewart E. Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts: Trust Law’s Race to the Bottom?, 85
CORNELL L. REV. 1035, 1060 (2000).
181 See, e.g., ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 6-16
(1993); William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The New Economics of Jurisdictional
Competition: Devolutionary Federalism in a Second-Best World, 86 GEO. L.J. 201, 235-39
(1997); Dennis Epple & Allan Zelenitz, The Implications of Competition Among Jurisdictions: Does Tiebout Need Politics?, 89 J. POL. ECON. 1197, 1204-10 (1981); Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. REV. 915, 945-49
(2005).
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Schanzenbach found that “the only states that experienced an increase
in trust business after abolishing the Rule [against Perpetuities] were
those that did not levy an income tax on trust funds attracted from out
of state.”182 Moreover, employment statistics for the financial industries
in states which have adopted DAPTs fail to show a significant “bump”
in the years post-adoption. For example, Alaska saw a small rise in financial industry jobs between 1997, the year the legislature DAPTs were
first passed, and the following year – and it saw the same increase in
every year before that and every year after, until 2008, which saw, unsurprisingly, a drop.183
Some people try to justify the creation of these trusts by arguing
that an overly litigious society justifies professionals in protecting their
assets from frivolous suits and exorbitant damage awards184 – and that
they will find ways to do this anyway — so American jurisdictions might
as well benefit from their business.185 The reality is, however, that most
unjustified or egregiously large damages awards are reduced on appeal,
and the filing of frivolous lawsuits is greatly exaggerated.186 Even if
over-litigation were the case – and there is much dispute187– it’s a far
cry from agreeing as a society that we will allow people to hold their
assets in such a way that their creditors cannot reach them.
PART IV:

THE NC SOLUTION

One way to check the proliferation of these undemocratic forms of
the trust is for courts to step into the breach. While it’s certainly possible for a democratic polity to opt out of NC altogether, ours has not
182
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done so: NC remains a principle of American property law. The expansion of the trust I have been describing is in effect an opt-out by stealth,
bypassing the democratic process which would be able to achieve such a
result. This is a place where courts have a role: they can – and do –
police the boundaries of the universe of property forms.188
Traditionally, the doctrine of “property exceptionalism” has relegated decisions about property forms to legislatures and kept them out
of the hands of judges.189 This is because, for property forms to enjoy
legitimacy, they must be the products of democratic “co-authorship” –
that is, legislation by elected representatives from all interest groups in
society – and judicial decisions are not “co-authored” in this way.190 It’s
not clear that this rationale always holds up, however. First, even proponents of legislative decision-making about property acknowledge the
possibility of a role for courts when “the legislative process underperforms due to interest groups” or when it is “incapable of performing at all.”191 As discussed above, the problem of legislative
underperformance of its democratic role due to interest group capture is
a particular one in property law, due to the arcane nature of the subject
and the attendant lack of popular interest or awareness of the issues it
raises.
These peculiarities make the creation and modification of trust
forms especially prone to rent-seeking and capture by interest groups
seeking narrow, self-interested goals,192 and thus fail to embody the
ideal of collective co-authorship. In such circumstances, courts may legitimately enter the fray. Indeed, judges necessarily hear from “both
sides,” which as we have seen, legislators often do not.193 Property
forms are about “expressing normative ideals with respect to core types
of human relationships regarding resources,”194 then judges seem wellpositioned to take part in the process of regulating property forms.
188 Merrill & Smith, supra note 24, at 4. See generally Henry E. Smith, Community
and Custom in Property, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 5, 34-36 (2009) (discussing the
willingness of U.S. courts to incorporate custom and its tensions with numerous clausus);
Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 385-88 (2001) (discussing limitations on forms of ownership in civil
law and common law systems).
189 Hanoch Dagan, Judges and Property, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE
COMMON LAW 17, 18 (Balganesh Shyamkrishna ed., 2013).
190 Dorfman, supra note 28, at 510-13. This discussion ignores the fact that several
states provide for the election of state court judges, a reality which seems to eliminate the
distinction for these purposes between legislative and judicial decision-making about
property, even under the tradition of exceptionalism.
191 Id.
192 Dagan, supra note 189, at 38.
193 Id. at 39.
194 Id. at 34.
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To the extent American courts have engaged in policing property
forms, their role has generally been to create new forms of property
through the expansive understanding of existing forms, such as the public trust doctrine,195 and the right of publicity.196 There is no reason,
however, that courts cannot police property form creation as well.
To some extent, courts are beginning to respond the new trust
forms at both the Federal and state level – although not by invoking NC.
The Federal Bankruptcy Code, and courts applying the Code, have
viewed DAPTs with skepticism.197 In Battley v. Mortensen,198 a case
which, according to one estate planning attorney, “reverberated
throughout the trust and estate planning world,”199 a Bankruptcy Court
voided Mortensen’s transfer of property to an Alaska DAPT under Section 548(e), the Code’s fraudulent transfer provision.200 In doing so, the
Court noted that this section “was enacted to close this ‘self-settled trust
loophole.’”201 This is a significant development: fear of bankruptcy is
one of the main reasons people seek APT protection.202 At the state
level, significant precedent indicates that states hostile to APTs will decline to enforce spendthrift provisions in foreign APTs.203
These trends are encouraging, but courts must go further: they
must, as I have done here, subject the equitable interests of trusts to NC
analysis. This means that when courts face a creditor seeking to attach
assets of a spendthrift trust, for example, the question is not whether to
create a “policy” based exception to the spendthrift provision for a particular type of creditor, but rather whether the property interest created
– a grant of property subject to the condition that it not be used to pay
the beneficiary’s creditors – appears on the NC list, and whether it
should. As this example shows, such analysis implicates centuries-old
forms of the trust, as well as more recent iterations like DAPTs. Does
the NC “closed list” allow for a type of property ownership which denies
195
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the owner’s creditors access to that property? Do we as a society want it
to?
Discarding the red herring of title split this way requires – or allows
– us to re-evaluate what we as participants in a democratic property
regime want from the trust. It forces us to face squarely the question of
what types of property ownership we want to allow. For example, one
of the original purposes of trusts was to protect the financially vulnerable such as minors, the disabled and the mentally ill. We might agree
that a property form which allowed such people to enjoy assets but
which keeps them out of reach of their creditors offered enough social
benefits to outweigh its cost, and that we were willing, as a society, to
absorb those costs. Asking such questions would force a much more
realistic evaluation of trust forms, one which would make their costs and
benefits clear by internalizing and thus making visible their externalities.
A model for a public conversation on the topic of trusts is the nonpartisan Boston College Forum on Philanthropy and the Public Good, which
gathers the nation’s leading experts in charitable giving to assess the
current state of philanthropy and tax law to raise and explore questions
about how philanthropy can best achieve its goals and what we as a
society want it to achieve.204 We need much the same effort for trust
law to publicize the issue of trust proliferation and publicly raise questions about what we as a society want this form of property ownership to
achieve – and what limits on it would be beneficial. Such a forum would
bring the issue out into the open, as the Philanthropy Forum has done
for charity and tax matters in a way which would allow a nonpartisan
assessment of the role trusts should play.
CONCLUSION
The creation and modification of property forms have a major impact on interpersonal interaction and our expectations about the rules
which govern it. In the words of Hanoch Dagan, “they shape and
reshape our social order, adjusting it to new circumstances, challenges
and opportunities.”205 Whether one supports efficiency or democratic
decision-making – or both – as rationales for NC, all these factors urge
its application to trusts. The formalistic focus on the title split has distracted the law from what is in plain sight: the purloined property interests of third parties who deal with trust beneficiaries. Ultimately, as
trusts become ever more popular with the wealthy, this includes most of
the rest of us.206
204 Philanthropy Forum, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW, https://www.bc.edu/bc-web/schools/
law/centers/philanthropy-forum.html (last visited July 19, 2017).
205 Dagan, supra note 189, at 40.
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The modifications of the trust I discuss here threaten to eviscerate
property’s role in a democratic society: the role of allowing some degree
of equal access to material self-expression, opportunity, remedies and
input into ownership norms, as well as bearing out peoples’ expectations
about interpersonal interactions. All of the trusts I present here work
against these aims by increasing inequality in access to resources, depriving creditors, both voluntary and involuntary, of their right to a remedy, and avoiding the proportional payment of taxes. Unsurprisingly,
and unlike other forms of liability “trade-offs” like the limited general
liability company and conservation servitudes, these trusts did not
emerge from decision-making in which the full range of social interests
had voice and in which the overall interests of society were a factor.
Rather, they emerged from behind closed doors where legislators signed
off on already-drafted laws designed solely to protect the wealth of a
few from the obligations society imposes on all of us. In the world of
the trust, the time is truly out of joint. If Gray’s ghost is to rest, we must
put it right.

